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GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT "TAKING LEGAL REASONING
SERIOUSLY"
J.M. BALKIN & SANFORD LEVINSON*
INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this symposium is Professor Markovits's
accusation-or at very least his genuine concern-that some
American legal academics these days no longer "take legal reasoning
seriously." This is no mere intellectual concern on his part, for he also
suggests that this failure has genuine consequences for the practice of
law and, ultimately, the quality of American life insofar as it is
structured by law.' If this be so, it is a grievous fault, and grievously
must these academics answer it. But we think that the charge itself
needs to be inspected carefully, not merely for what it says, but for
what it does.
In this essay we are interested both in Professor Markovits's
specific views about "seriousness" and the more general question of
what it means to take legal reasoning seriously. The two are not
identical. Professor Markovits believes that taking legal reasoning
seriously requires a commitment to belief in objectively right answers
to questions of law that people can arrive at by reasoning about and
through certain rights and principles.2 This theory of "serious" legal
reasoning is inspired in large part by Ronald Dworkin's early work,
although Professor Markovits apparently now believes that even
Dworkin does not take legal reasoning sufficiently seriously.3
Nevertheless, one suspects that not everyone worried about the
current state of legal academic writing (or reasoning) will sign on to
Professor Markovits's views about the requirements of a "serious"
commitment to law and legal reasoning. Many people may insist that
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School;
W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Regents Chair, University of Texas School
of Law.
1. See Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to
Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415 (1999).
2. Seeid. at415.
3. See id. at 451-53.
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they believe in the relative autonomy of legal discourse from
politics-or from other academic disciplines-but still fight shy of
Professor Markovits's particular theories about rights and right
answers. These legal thinkers might well worry that other scholars do
not take legal reasoning sufficiently seriously; yet, from Professor
Markovits's perspective, they too are culpable examples of legal
apostasy.4 If Professor Markovits is to be believed, not many
members of the current legal academy really do take legal reasoning
seriously these days.
Indeed, as we will shortly discover, Professor Markovits's theory
of "serious" commitment to law has the unfortunate consequence
that very few of the people who actually practice law in the world
outside the academy take legal reasoning "seriously" as he defines the
term. Practicing lawyers are devoted to promoting their clients'
interests. They are paid good money not to produce right answers
rightly reasoned but answers that benefit their clients. Hence, they
will normally make whatever grammatically permissible legal
arguments will best achieve this goal, whether or not they seem the
most sound to them. These lawyers are neither Dworkinian nor
Markovitsian in their attitude toward law. Nor is the inferior court
judge, whose work consists largely in the interstitial readings of
higher court precedents, whether she regards these precedents as well
or poorly reasoned. One has to wonder whether a theory of serious
legal reasoning so disconfirmed by the actual social practices it
purports to describe and regulate can be taken, well, seriously.
Beyond Professor Markovits's particular theory, however, is the
larger question of what is at stake in the charge that someone
"doesn't take legal reasoning seriously." We think that such
accusations are usually disciplining moves by persons involved in a
struggle over the direction and future of a practice. They are
symptoms of an interpretive dispute over whose vision of the practice
shall prevail. Often both the accuser and the accused will insist that
the other is misunderstanding the practice. When this happens,
probably the last thing one can say about the participants in such a
struggle is that they do not take the practice seriously. Each side is
usually quite serious about the practice and about the direction in
which they want it to go-that is the reason why the struggle between
4. See, e.g., id. at 440-60 (finding the views of Legal Realists, members of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement, Legal Pragmatists, Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson, Judge
Learned Hand, John Hart Ely, unnamed "Strict Constructionists," Ronald Dworkin,
communitarian and libertarian legal scholars, and Bruce Ackerman wanting).
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them is so determined and fierce. And that is yet another reason why
the charge that someone is not "serious" about the practice should
itself be taken with a grain of salt.
I. Do PRACTICING LAWYERS "TAKE LEGAL REASONING
SERIOUSLY"?
Professor Markovits's complaint against the contemporary legal
academy is surely heartfelt. Yet it raises the interesting question
whether there is in fact anyone who takes legal reasoning seriously in
the way that he thinks they should, aside from himself and (possibly)
an earlier incarnation of Ronald Dworkin.
Markovits's argument vacillates over whether "taking legal
reasoning seriously" is a matter of internal states of mind or external
performance. To "take legal reasoning seriously," does one actually
have to believe in objectively right legal answers arrived at through
rights discourse, or is it sufficient that one simply talks as if one does?
In religious terms, must one have faith or is it sufficient to engage in
the rituals that faith prescribes? Perhaps the post-structuralist writer
of academic screeds and the lawyer-economist may be condemned for
flunking both requirements. But when we turn to the practicing
lawyer or judge, the distinction becomes quite important.
The reasoning practices of lawyers are, in most cases,
grammatically acceptable versions of what we call "lawtalk." 5
Lawyers cite cases and statutes, they offer legislative histories and
principled justifications. Yet the internal beliefs and motivations of
practicing attorneys differ markedly from the dogmas of rights and
right answers that Markovits presses upon us. Lawyers defending
their clients do not want to make "the" objectively correct legal
argument. Nor is it clear that they even believe such a thing exists.
Rather, they want to make the most plausible argument that will
substantially advance their clients' interests. To be sure, psychological
pressures to reduce cognitive dissonance may lead some lawyers to
believe that the arguments they make on behalf of their clients are
actually the best legal position. But this change in beliefs-whether
labeled "the getting of wisdom" or "self-deception" -does not occur
in every case. Moreover, even when a lawyer convinces herself that
the truth is on her side, it is not the pursuit of objectively correct right
5. On the notion of "lawtalk," see J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Grammar, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1771,1774-78 (1994).
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answers that motivates the lawyer's argument, but the desire to win
the case. If the lawyer were to discover that her client's interests (or
desires) had changed in the interim, she would be duty bound to
argue for still another legal position with equal zeal and forcefulness.6
These facts about the legal profession make Professor
Markovits's theory deeply ironic. Lawyers not only are required to
make arguments they do not personally believe,7 but also are required
to make them in a rhetorical form that appears to take law very
seriously indeed and that insists that the positions they espouse are
the objectively correct answers. Indeed, most briefs we have read state
emphatically that there are right answers to legal questions and, not
surprisingly, that these answers demonstrate conclusively why the
client deserves to win. Thus, the irony of Markovits's theory of law is
that it describes what lawyers must simulate rather than what they
must believe in order to fulfill their professional obligations to their
clients.
Professor Markovits's view also seems to be largely irrelevant to
the practices of the vast majority of the judiciary. Most judges in the
6. As an example, consider the change in position taken by the Solicitor General of the
United States in United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992), a case that considered the
desegregation obligations of state-run colleges and universities. After the Solicitor General filed
a brief on behalf of the United States, President Bush indicated his disagreement with the
position. The Solicitor General's office then filed a new brief taking a contrary position. See
Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1991, at B6. As Greenhouse wrote, "[a] virtually unheard-of footnote" in the new brief
explained, "Suggestions to the contrary in our opening brief no longer reflect the position of the
United States." Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). There was no suggestion
that the change in position was the result of further legal analysis that persuaded the highly
professional lawyers in the Solicitor General's Office that their earlier position had been
mistaken. Rather, their boss, the President of the United States, ordered them to take the
different position, and they did so. Although the abrupt reversal in positions was no doubt
embarrassing to the lawyers concerned, no one at the time suggested that the Solicitor General,
sometimes dubbed "the tenth justice," see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987), had behaved unethically or
unprofessionally in crafting his arguments to the Court to fit the demands of his client. What is
unusual about the episode was not the shaping of argument to client interest but its overtly
public character. It is as if the curtain had come up too quickly in a play or opera, so that the
audience could see the actors still putting on their makeup or otherwise performing "out of
role." Most lawyerly submission to the commands of their clients takes place "backstage," as it
were, rather than before the watchful eye of the New York Times dramatic (or legal) critic. See
J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law as Performance, in LAW AND LITERATURE 729 (Michael
Freeman & Andrew Lewis eds., 1999).
7. Although Professor Markovits seems to identify the "serious" lawyer with the
practitioner of a certain theory of legal philosophy, actual lawyers are much closer to the rhetor
of ancient Greece. In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates subjects the rhetor to withering criticism
precisely because the rhetor is willing to use all of his art and oratorical wiles to make the worse
argument appear the better. See PLATO, GORGIAS, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
229 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., W.D. Woodhead trans., 1961). On the
comparison of lawyers and rhetors, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 215 (1985).
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United States are "inferior" judges whose decisions are reviewed by
some higher court. As a result, much of their work requires them to
follow the precedents of these higher courts, even if they believe
these precedents to be wrongly decided and objectively incorrect. Do
these judges "take legal reasoning seriously" if they write opinions to
justify these legal rulings?
Consider, for example, whether a federal district court judge is
free to reject a preposterous opinion issued by the circuit court within
which her court is located. Suppose that the judge further believes
that the decision pays too much attention to previous Supreme Court
decisions that are themselves highly dubious and that wholly ignore
the approved Markovitsian forms of rights-based legal reasoning.
Even so, a district judge would be hard-pressed to ignore a "binding"
decision of a higher court merely because it does not meet the judge's
own adequacy conditions for serious legal reasoning.
To be sure, one might argue that once a higher court has created
a precedent, "the" correct legal solution always requires a strict
adherence to it, whether or not the original precedent was correctly
decided. But we are unsure that Professor Markovits actually holds
this view, largely because he does not seem to have considered the
institutional situation of inferior courts at all. His examples of
"serious" legal reasoning seem to apply best to courts like the
Supreme Court of the United States, which may follow their own
previous precedents but are by no means required to. Indeed,
Professor Markovits's vision of legal reasoning seems to be one that
assumes that the standards of legal reasoning are the same for the
legal academic and the "judge"-i.e., a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Yet only a passing acquaintance with the legal system of the United
States (or almost any other country for that matter) suggests that
institutional differences between different positions in the legal
system matter greatly to how one reasons about and with the law.
The institutional demands of legal reasoning may differ
depending upon one's position in this complex web of institutional
structures. The kind of "legal reasoning" required to present an
argument before the United States Supreme Court may draw on
talents different from those required of the Justice writing the opinion
in the case. If we move our attention from the Supreme Court to what
the Constitution labels "inferior" courts, or from appellate courts to
trial courts, or from courts to legislative debate (as in the recent
Clinton impeachment), to the drafting of rules and regulations, or
even to the composition of op-ed pieces or letters to the editor, the
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definition of appropriate legal reasoning may shift as well.
It is a strange legal philosophy that would take Supreme Court
Justices as models of "serious" legal reasoning. We have already
noted that they inhabit a very particular institutional position not
shared by most of the legal system. Moreover, even that exalted
position makes a sort of Markovitsian view of legal reasoning
hopelessly naive and impractical. The institutional demands of
achieving majority opinions, the institutional obligations of
collegiality in an ongoing enterprise, the need to write opinions that
will constrain and structure the behavior of potentially recalcitrant
executive and administrative officials, the need to send appropriate
signals to inferior court judges, and the need to communicate to the
public in a way that will maintain the legitimacy and dignity of the
Court: each or all of these may lead Justices to sign opinions that do
not reflect their considered views or even their preferred methods of
constitutional argument.8 There is perhaps no better example than the
Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.9 If the opinion in
Brown has often been regarded as inadequate, those inadequacies
stem in part from Chief Justice Warren's desire to achieve a
unanimous opinion that would send a clear message to the South that
the Court spoke with one voice on this issue and Warren's desire to
produce an opinion that would be "'readable by the lay public." ' 10
Moreover, to achieve this unanimity, Justice Stanley Reed had to
agree not to publicly reveal that he disagreed with the opinion
because he felt that segregated schools were constitutional. Should
Justice Reed be condemned because he did not "take legal reasoning
seriously"?11
8. See Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 196-200 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Levinson, supra note 8, at 198 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE
CONSTITUTION 58 (1992) (quoting a memorandum from Warren to his fellow Justices)).
11. Robert Post, who is currently writing a history of the Taft Court for the Holmes Devise
series on the history of the Supreme Court, informs us that the unanimous opinions of that
Court did not necessarily reflect the actual legal views of the Justices in conference, which were
often divided. Apparently, it was the custom that Justices indicated their dissent only when they
felt deeply about the matter and that, otherwise, they would be expected simply to acquiesce in
the views of the majority of their colleagues. Conversation between Sanford Levinson and
Robert Post (Mar. 5, 1999). Of course today's Court has adopted a very different practice,
although a similar push towards unanimity is not uncommon on circuit courts. One wonders,
nevertheless, whether the current Court, with its proclivity for dissents and partial concurrences,
manifests a greater respect for legal reasoning than did the Taft Court that included, among
others, Holmes, Brandeis, Sutherland, Taft, and Stone.
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II. SHOULD TEACHERS OF LAW "TAKE LEGAL REASONING
SERIOUSLY"?
Markovits suggests that law professors who reject his argument
that there are objectively correct answers to questions of legal rights
disserve our culture by inculcating a false view of the law in our
students. 2 Presumably this means that professors who agree with him
will teach in importantly different ways from professors who continue
to be misled by American Legal Realism or other jurisprudential
theories that reject the "right answer" thesis. We are unconvinced
that this is true, unless perhaps the Markovitsian professor adamantly
refuses to teach anything but a certain approved form of rights-based
legal argument. Yet if there are any significant differences in teaching
style, we think the Markovitsian teacher is more likely to create a
kind of schizophrenia in his charges and more likely to disserve their
legal education than a thoroughly Realist instructor. The reason is
simple: As we have seen, even if one fully accepts Markovits's
theories about right answers and legitimate forms of legal argument,
these views are not particularly relevant to the work of practicing
lawyers, and that is the sort of work that most law students are
presumably being trained to perform. The students we law professors
prepare for practice will often have to profess positions they do not
necessarily believe. They will also be expected to express those
positions using a variety of conventionally accepted forms of legal
argument, many of which are irrelevant or illegitimate given
Professor Markovits's theory of rights-based reasoning.
Thus, a Markovitsian legal education is more likely to disserve
the student and produce professional schizophrenia because lawyers
have no professional duty to make only "true" legal arguments. Quite
the contrary, lawyers owe a duty to their clients to make whatever
conventionally acceptable arguments are likely to persuade the
decision-maker before whom they appear. If these arguments are
"right answers" in Markovits's sense, so much the better, but lawyers'
failure to meet this standard is entirely irrelevant, at least as long as
their arguments are not deemed so inadequate as to be deemed
"frivolous" by conventional standards. 13 Indeed, we venture to claim
that a lawyer who insisted on making only arguments that would
satisfy the strictures of Professor Markovits's theory would be
12. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 461-63.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.1 (1983).
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committing professional malpractice.
This point applies both at the level of the correctness of the
positions taken and the forms of argument used to establish them.
Lawyers must be prepared not only to argue for positions they do not
believe, but also to argue for these positions using conventional forms
of legal argument that do not persuade them but are likely to
persuade their audience. These forms of argument include arguments
of prudence, social policy, or economic efficiency that deviate from
Professor Markovits's notion of "serious" legal argument. To fail to
make the argument most likely to persuade one's audience simply
because it is not a "serious" form of legal reasoning according to
one's own philosophical standards is to betray one's client and,
arguably, to violate canons of professional responsibility. 14
Just as lawyers must be willing to make conventional arguments
that persuade, so too law professors must be willing to teach their
students how to make the kinds of arguments that will be useful to
them in representing future clients. To refuse to teach these forms of
argument out of a misguided sense of philosophical purity disserves
the student. A law professor committed to a theory of originalism and
jurisprudentially repulsed by appeals to "fundamental rights" would
nonetheless have a duty to teach her students how to make and
respond to nonoriginalist arguments about equality and fundamental
rights for the simple reason that these arguments are part of
contemporary legal vocabulary. She obviously does not have to
approve of them, and she may criticize them severely, both in the
classroom and in her scholarly writing. But she must acknowledge
their existence and their importance as part of conventional legal
discourse. In the same way, a law professor who thought that
originalism was a worthless approach to constitutional interpretation
would not be justified in refusing to teach her students how to make
and respond to appeals to history and original intention. Even if she
thinks originalism baseless, her students may someday practice before
14. See id. Rule 1.3, cmt. 1 (duty of zealous advocacy); see also id. Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."). The comment to Rule 3.1 explicitly notes that an
"action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will
not [or, presumably, should not] prevail," so long as there is a "good faith" argument available.
See id. cmt. 3; REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 204 (Stephen Gillers &
Roy D. Simon eds., 1998); see also Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know
Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 358-62 (1986) (discussing frivolous legal
arguments under Rule 11 of the United States Rules of Civil Procedure and the duty of lawyers,
as officers of the court, to present fairly arguable points).
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a judge who accepts this form of argument. Just as it would be
professional malpractice for a lawyer to refuse to make nonfrivolous
but incorrect arguments if it would help her client, a law professor
would fail in her obligations to her students if she refused to teach
them generally accepted forms of legal argument.15
In short, we think that Professor Markovits offers an unrealistic
vision of what people who "take legal reasoning seriously" might be
doing. This may not be enough to invalidate his jurisprudential theory
but, at the least, it calls into question its relevance to the existing
social practices of law. A jurisprudential theory that bears such little
connection to the work of those actually involved in the practice of
law, whether as teachers, attorneys, or adjudicators, is too solipsistic
for us to credit.
III. WHAT IS AT STAKE IN A DEBATE ABOUT "TAKING LEGAL
REASONING SERIOUSLY"?
Our criticisms of Professor Markovits's particular version of
serious legal reasoning do not mean that we think that the notion of
"taking legal reasoning seriously" is unimportant. To the contrary,
the question of what "serious" performance of law and legal
reasoning involves is one of the most important questions of
jurisprudence, which we have tried to address in numerous-if
unconventional-ways. 16 However, we believe that debates about who
is and who is not taking legal reasoning seriously must be approached
sociologically as well as philosophically. A charge like this one is as
15. Doug Laycock informs us that when he took Philip Kurland's course on criminal
procedure in 1972 at the University of Chicago, Kurland refused to teach the Warren Court's
constitutional decisions in the field. See E-mail from Douglas Laycock to E-mail Listserv: Law
and Religion Issues for Law Academics (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with authors). Assuming that
Laycock's reminiscences are accurate, we still do not know why Kurland refused to teach these
cases. Perhaps he thought that all the important principles of criminal procedure were outlined
in pre-1960 constitutional opinions and that later cases simply offered new permutations on old
debates. Perhaps he thought that cases like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were not
really central to the basic issues in criminal procedure or were too detailed for an introductory
course. Or perhaps he omitted these cases because he genuinely thought they would soon be
overruled and so would be worthless to students practicing law in a few years. However, if
Kurland refused to teach these cases because he thought they were wrongly decided, his
decision seems at best idiosyncratic and self-indulgent; we think it would have been far better to
show his students why these cases were illegitimate than to pretend that they did not exist in
positive law.
16. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 5, at 1771; J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843 (1996); J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1991);
Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text, Structure and Intentions Really Seriously: Constitutional
Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995).
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important for what it does as what it says. We think that the
accusation that one's opponent "doesn't take legal reasoning
seriously" is usually a kind of disciplining move. It attempts to fix the
boundaries of the social practice by an interpretation that leaves one's
opponent outside of the practice (and, therefore, an apostate or
imposter), unless he or she conforms to one's favored interpretation.
Thus, whether a person "takes legal reasoning seriously" is not
merely a matter of discovering a correspondence between what a
certain legal thinker endorses and what actually constitutes the
practice of legal reasoning. The practice of legal reasoning is a socially
constructed enterprise whose boundaries and conventions are
constantly under negotiation by its participants and, therefore, tend
to change over time. Furthermore, legal reasoning may not be a
single, unitary practice with a single purpose or point but a series of
interrelated practices by persons in different social positions with
different tasks and considerations.17 Making accusations concerning
who is serious and who is not serious about law or legal reasoning is
itself a maneuver within the practice of legal reasoning. It is a move
or stratagem in an ongoing struggle over what the practice of legal
reasoning is and should become, a struggle over which forms and
practices of legal reasoning shall be considered to be primary, central,
ordinary, or orthodox and which forms and practices shall be
considered secondary, peripheral, abnormal, or deviant. Professor
Markovits is engaged in promoting a particular, rather narrow version
of this orthodoxy, but that in itself does not make him particularly
special. The lawyer-economist, the feminist scholar, as well as the
traditional doctrinalist all struggle over the boundaries of "legal
reasoning," albeit with different concerns, perspectives, and attitudes
about this practice.
As these remarks indicate, our own views of "good" or "serious"
legal reasoning are largely sociological and historicist. We do not
think that there is a single form of proper legal reasoning that
transcends times and cultures, nor are we sure that there is one and
only one way to take legal reasoning seriously, even within a single
time and culture. This is not the first time that the issue of "who really
believes in law" has been raised, even within the relatively brief life of
the American legal academy.18 In fact, law professors, judges, and
17. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 139-43 (1993).
18. Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies, especially, have been traditional targets,
though Law and Economics has also come under attack even from some conservatives who are
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captains of the legal profession seem to spend an awful lot of time
worrying about whether their colleagues are reasoning in an
appropriate manner or have decayed into some unspeakable form of
apostasy.
We think that recurrent disputes over whether people are
"taking legal reasoning seriously" are forms of Kulturkampf- they
are struggles over whose form of reasoning shall bear the title of
"legal reasoning" and whose shall be regarded as juridical heresy.
Indeed, our experience as teachers of the history of constitutional law
strongly suggests to us that the criteria for "good" or "serious" legal
reasoning have changed markedly over time, especially as the
participants in the practice and their respective social positions have
changed. Moreover, even in our own age, we believe that there are in
fact many different forms of "legal reasoning" practiced by people
with different roles and perspectives within the legal system, so that
the category of "serious" legal reasoning is a moving target. 19
In particular, we want to emphasize the possible differences
among the reasoning practices of academics, lawyers, judges, and
others in the legal system. We want to resist the seemingly natural
assumption that some group of legal academics, along with judges and
lawyers, takes legal reasoning seriously while some other misbegotten
group of legal academics does not. This assumption seems natural
because many legal academics take the practicing bar (and the
practicing bench) as standard examples of "real law"; they tend to
identify themselves with the work of lawyers and particularly the
work of judges.20 Yet although legal academics often identify strongly
with the work of lawyers and judges, and some academics may even
practice law themselves, their work as academics differs importantly
from the work of judges and especially from the work of practicing
critical of its disdain of traditional doctrinal analysis. See LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF (1940); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) (attack on both Critical
Legal Studies and Law and Economics); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 222 (1984) (attack on Critical Legal Studies); Sanford Levinson, A Nation Under
Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society-Mary Ann
Glendon, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 143 (1995) (book review); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 157-62 (1988) [hereinafter LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH] (discussion of
Carrington and the broader issue of what beliefs should be a precondition for joining the legal
academy).
19. See Balkin, supra note 17, at 140.
20. See Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2053, 2055-57 (1993). See
generally ROGER B. COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1989) (criticizing
theories of legal reasoning that identify law with what judges do).
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lawyers. The different social positions of these three groups produce
different versions of legal reasoning with different purposes and
motivations. These forms of reasoning surely overlap in many
important respects and they consider many of the same materials.
However, because the practicing bench and bar exist in a different
community and a different social setting with different responsibili-
ties, their tools and devices of legal understanding may sometimes
differ considerably from those of relatively cloistered legal academics.
Attacks on interdisciplinary interventions in the name of "legal
reasoning" tend to collapse the work of academics with those of
lawyers-and particularly judges. This identification has strong
elements of wishful thinking and even fantasy. 21 Legal academics do
not have clients for whom arguments must be tailored, and they are
not bound by precedents in the same way as most judges are bound.
Indeed, to take legal reasoning seriously in the way that academics
sometimes do means not to take it seriously in the way that practicing
lawyers and judges must, and vice versa. What we have, in short, is
not a single example of "serious legal reasoning" from which a few
misguided heretics and malcontents stray, but a whole set of related
but competing versions of legal reasoning that appear and thrive in
different social settings, that occasionally conflict and compete with
each other for dominance and influence, and that, over time, may
become quite differentiated from each other because of the
expectations and responsibilities of the persons and communities that
employ them.
IV. INTERPRETIVE DISPUTES ABOUT "SERIOUS" LEGAL
REASONING
In short, charges that someone is not "taking legal reasoning
seriously" usually disguise an interpretive dispute about the
boundaries and conventions of the practice of legal reasoning. Here
are three alternative versions of such a dispute, in which A and B
might charge each other with "not taking legal reasoning seriously":
(1) Contrary to B, A does not think that there is, strictly
speaking, a distinct set of arguments and forms of reasoning that are
"legal," although there may be arguments that are not legal. A sees
legal reasoning as continuous with, and informed by many other
different varieties of, practical reasoning. Hence, unlike B, A does not
21. See Schlag, supra note 20, at 2055-57.
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take seriously a categorical distinction between purely legal and other
forms of reasoning. A does not contest that what people call "legal
reasoning" is efficacious or authoritative, but A does not believe that
the category is a fixed set. A takes legal reasoning seriously, but A
does not take the category of "legal reasoning" seriously.
(2) A might think that there are many different forms of legal
reasoning but that one particular version (or group of versions) is
distinctively better than the others. Among these other deficient
forms of legal reasoning is B's preferred version. As a result, A does
not take these other forms of legal reasoning seriously, or as seriously
as B does. In fact, A may even doubt that these other forms are really
"legal" at all. So while B insists that A does not take "legal reasoning"
seriously, from A's perspective B's interpretation of "legal reasoning"
is not the best interpretation and may not even qualify as "legal
reasoning." In this case, taking one form of legal reasoning seriously
means taking competing forms less seriously or not at all.
(3) A thinks that more than one form of legal reasoning is
efficacious and authoritative. Put another way, A takes too many
different possible forms of legal reasoning seriously as potentially
efficacious or authoritative. Perhaps A believes that given the
multiplicity of different forms of legal argument, there is no hierarchy
among them; there are no decision procedures that conclusively
explain when an historical argument trumps a doctrinal argument, or
when an efficiency argument trumps a corrective justice argument.22
B, on the other hand, has a single, preferred form of reasoning, or B
believes that there is a hierarchy of forms of argument. As a result, A
does not take some particular form of legal reasoning as seriously as
the adherents of that form prefer. From B's standpoint, A is not
taking "legal reasoning" seriously because A does not give B's
preferred form of legal reasoning the same authority, weight, and
status that B expects.
Note that these debates about "taking legal reasoning seriously"
do not involve fights between people who are clearly "insiders" and
"outsiders" or "believers" and "nonbelievers"; rather, they are fights
about who is an insider and who is an outsider. They all involve
disputes internal to the practice of legal reasoning in the sense that
each of the participants believes that he or she is operating within the
22. See PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-13, 31-33 (1992) (offering
an account of the various "modalities" of constitutional discourse and arguing that there is no
hierarchy or rank order that allows a principled choice when these modalities conflict).
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practice. To be sure, some participants may insist that because others
hold certain views they are necessarily outside the practice of legal
reasoning, so they cannot by definition take legal reasoning seriously;
but of course the definition of "legal reasoning" is the very question
at issue.
We have used the language of "believers" and "nonbelievers"
advisedly, for there are strong analogies between disputes over legal
culture and disputes over religious belief.23 Consider, for example,
two different forms of a given religion. Adherents in one group are
syncretic: they believe that it is perfectly appropriate to draw on or
incorporate other philosophical or religious traditions, perhaps even
going so far as to recognize deities from other faiths. Their
opponents, who are not syncretic, oppose all hint of "foreign" or
"alien" influence; indeed, they define their religion precisely in terms
of the heresies that it resists. The second group will insist that the first
does not take the religion seriously because they dilute and debauch
it; the first will insist that the second group wrongfully cuts itself off
from important sources of spiritual enlightenment. Both the syncretist
and the reactive versions of the religion may believe that they are
taking the religion seriously and that the other side is not.
This sort of dispute is quite familiar in the history of many
religions. Consider the strident anathemae visited on non-Orthodox
rabbis by many Orthodox rabbis in the United States and Israel.
Because the non-Orthodox rabbis are viewed as not taking traditional
norms of Jewish law with sufficient seriousness, their Orthodox
counterparts refuse to recognize non-Orthodox rabbis as legitimate
members of the community who are authorized to perform such basic
rites as weddings or conversions.2 4 From the perspective of the
Orthodox rabbis, no Conservative or Reform Jew could possibly be
taking Jewish law seriously, whatever contrary claims might be
asserted. But, obviously, this is not the perspective of Conservative or
Reform Jews themselves, who insist that they are "modernizing"
Jewish law in an effort to maintain it as a living presence -which is to
take it very seriously indeed-while their reactionary opponents are
23. See generally LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 18.
24. See, e.g., Samuel C. Heilman, Orthodoxy, in THE OXFORD DICIONARY OF THE
JEWISH RELIGION 516, 516 (R.J. Zwi Werblowsky & Geoffrey Wigoder eds., 1997)
("[Rielations between Orthodox and non-Orthodox are especially troubled by Orthodox refusal
to recognize the marriages, divorces, and conversions carried out by rabbis who do not submit
to the authority of traditional Jewish law."). Anyone familiar with the contemporary Jewish
communities in the United States and Israel is aware that the disputes between Orthodox and
non-Orthodox Jews are becoming ever more bitter.
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stunting and rejecting Judaism's long and rich historical tradition of
religious innovation.2 5 And, of course, even as the three branches of
Judaism contend among themselves, all three would join in
delegitimizing the claims of a "Jew for Jesus"; asserting that no one
who believes in the divinity of Jesus could take Judaism seriously.
In the same fashion, we can imagine two different views about
legal reasoning: One approach thinks it perfectly appropriate to make
arguments from efficiency in addition to or in place of precedential
arguments; the other approach does not. People adhering to the
second view may deny that the lawyer-economist takes legal
reasoning seriously because the lawyer-economist does not attempt to
give reasons in terms of existing doctrinal categories and existing
precedents. But the lawyer-economist might respond that legal
reasoning includes arguments about efficiency as well as arguments
about precedent and that the "arid" doctrinalist simply has too
pinched and narrow a conception of legal reasoning. From the
lawyer-economist's perspective, the doctrinalist conceals from herself
some of the most important and enlightening features of the practice
in which she claims to believe.
Indeed, when we see these forms of Kulturkampf at work, there
is something quite misleading about the claim that one side or the
other does not take the practice "seriously." Usually both sides take
their vision of the practice quite seriously indeed; so seriously, in fact,
that they interpret the other side's equal seriousness as the ultimate
proof of their apostasy. One might think that a person who does not
take a practice seriously regards the practice as unworthy, lacks
loyalty to the practice, makes fun of the practice, or views the practice
skeptically or condescendingly. But when people fight over the
meaning of a practice and accuse each other of failing to take the
practice seriously, none of this may be the case. All of the combatants
may have considerable loyalties to the practice; that is why they are
fighting over it so fiercely. What is at stake in these disputes is not
who is really serious about the practice and who is merely mocking it,
25. See Elliot Nelson Dorff, Conservative Judaism, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE
JEWISH RELIGION, supra note 24, at 172, 172 (Conservative Judaism sought "to conserve
tradition in the modern setting"); Kerry M. Olitzky, Reform Judaism, in THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF THE JEWISH RELIGION, supra note 24, at 577, 577 (defining Reform Judaism as
"a religious movement advocating the modification of Orthodox tradition in conforming with
the exigencies of contemporary life and thought"); see also MICHAEL A. MEYER, RESPONSE TO
MODERNITY: A HISTORY OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM vii (1988) (describing
Reform Judaism as "that branch of Judaism which has been most hospitable to the modern
critical temper while still endeavoring to maintain continuity of faith and practice with Jewish
religious tradition").
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parodying it, or disparaging it from the outside. What is at stake is
whose vision of the practice shall prevail and whether one or many
different interpretations of the practice shall survive and flourish.
Like other professional and academic disciplines, the practice
and study of law will always generate self-appointed guardians who
will seek to police the boundaries of acceptable practice by
denominating what counts as "serious" or "acceptable" modes of
legal discourse. At the same time, everyone within the practice will
have an intuitive sense that there are boundaries, though, for better
and worse, there will usually be substantial disagreement about where
the lines are drawn. In short, perhaps the only thing one can be sure
of in disputes about who is taking legal reasoning seriously is that the
disputes will be never ending as long as the practice endures.
